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INTRODUCTION 
In his recent article, Disclosure’s Effects: WikiLeaks and Transparency,1 Mark 
Fenster argues that WikiLeaks demonstrates the “impossibility” of balancing 
the public benefits of national-security-information disclosure with the 
effects of the disclosure on the nation’s national security and foreign policy 
interests.2 This article is a continuation of Professor Fenster’s previous work 
examining the costs and benefits of transparency.3 In his prior work, he 
fleshes out the criticisms of the current transparency regime that appear 
somewhat fleetingly here: namely, that we should question the assumption 
that transparency promotes an informed and engaged electorate as well as 
better, more responsive, and accountable government.4 
I wholeheartedly agree with Professor Fenster’s argument that 
calculating the costs and benefits of the disclosure of national security 
information is a frustratingly difficult task. I am not sure anyone truly 
disagrees with that argument. But an underlying assumption of Professor 
Fenster’s argument is that balancing the effects of disclosure against the 
benefits to the public discourse are at the heart of the laws relating to the 
unauthorized disclosure of national security information by government 
insiders and outsiders. Although the various statutes and regulations aimed 
at controlling the disclosure of sensitive national security information may 
strive to strike the right balance between the harm to national security and 
the free flow of information in a democracy, judges themselves are rarely 
required to do this kind of explicit balancing. While balancing is common in 
other areas of the First Amendment, such as the rights of government 
employees,5 the reporters’ privilege,6 and the right to engage in anonymous 
speech,7 it is not clear that balancing is required in cases involving the 
unauthorized disclosure of national security information. 
 
 1. Mark Fenster, Disclosure’s Effects: WikiLeaks and Transparency, 97 IOWA L. REV. 753 
(2012). 
 2. Id. at 782. 
 3. Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 893 (2006) (“Rather 
than abstract normative claims and rhetoric, what is needed is some realism about 
transparency’s costs and benefits for the public, for governance, and for the relationship 
between the public and government.”). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (holding that the First 
Amendment requires courts to balance “the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees”). 
 6. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1173–78 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(Tatel, J., concurring) (suggesting balancing of harm against newsworthiness to evaluate 
reporter-privilege claims in leak cases).  
 7. Some lower courts, considering motions to “unmask” an anonymous speaker, have 
held one of the relevant factors is whether the alleged harm to the plaintiff outweighs the value 
of the anonymous speech. See, e.g., Highfields Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969 
(N.D. Cal. 2005); Doe v. 2theMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2001); 
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Examining this underlying premise is important because Professor 
Fenster’s ultimate conclusion is that because judges are not equipped to do 
this balancing, it should be left to expert commissions and panels.8 It is 
unclear, however, what expert commission or panel Professor Fenster has in 
mind to resolve any criminal charges the government might attempt to 
bring against Julian Assange or any other government outsider who engages 
in the unauthorized dissemination of national security information, or for 
the criminal charges increasingly levied against government insiders who 
leak. I agree with Professor Fenster that it would be a great idea to embrace 
entities like the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel that help 
eliminate excessive overclassification. But they cannot resolve the difficult 
questions that arise when government insiders disclose and government 
outsiders disseminate information that the government had wanted to keep 
secret. 
Going forward, Congress and the courts must do some serious thinking 
about when the unauthorized disclosure of national security information is 
protected as a matter of statutory or constitutional law. I agree with 
Professor Fenster’s criticisms of any test that would require a court to 
balance the costs and benefits of disclosure. I suggest some approaches 
Congress could take that might approximate this balance without requiring 
the courts to do the balancing on a case-by-case basis. 
I. OVERSTATING THE ROLE OF BALANCING 
Throughout his article, Professor Fenster emphasizes how WikiLeaks 
has demonstrated how difficult it is for judges to balance the harm to 
national security against the benefits of disclosure. A balancing test is not as 
ingrained in the law as Professor Fenster suggests, however; indeed, he has 
noted this himself in his prior work, at least with respect to the Freedom of 
Information Act (“FOIA”).9 It may be the goal of any attempt to resolve the 
tug-and-pull between necessary secrecy and an informed democracy, but the 
balance does not explicitly appear in most of the relevant statutes. It is also 
hardly settled that the First Amendment requires such a balance. 
It is useful to distinguish among three sets of legal rules: (1) legal rules 
that affirmatively require the government to disclose information; (2) legal 
 
Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 
756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).  
 8. Fenster, supra note 1, at 807 (“A more effective approach would be to strengthen and 
model new entities on permanent or temporary administrative bodies that more independently 
and expertly decide consequential claims about disclosure’s dangerous effects . . . [and that] 
have been more effective than courts in making difficult decisions about information 
disclosure.”). 
 9. See Fenster, supra note 3, at 938 & n.230 (noting that “courts reviewing FOIA 
challenges to government refusals to disclose documents generally do not make particularized 
considerations that weigh the respective values of disclosure and nondisclosure,” except in cases 
involving the FOIA’s privacy exceptions in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (2006)). 
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rules that apply to government “insiders” (government employees and 
contractors) who engage in the unauthorized disclosure of information; and 
(3) legal rules that apply to government “outsiders” (those without 
authorized access to government information) who engage in the 
unauthorized disclosure of information. Balancing is more prevalent in 
statutes and regulations that govern what the government is affirmatively 
obligated to disclose, not clearly present or required in cases involving 
government outsiders, and entirely absent in cases involving government 
insiders. 
A. AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO DISCLOSE 
Balancing is most prevalent in statutes and regulations that affirmatively 
require the disclosure of information. Certain privacy exemptions of the 
FOIA require judges to balance the privacy interests at stake with the public 
interest in disclosure.10 The various exemptions from the FOIA’s sweep 
perhaps represent a higher-level form of categorical balancing, in that 
Congress must have decided with respect to each exempted category that 
the public’s interest in disclosure did not outweigh the interests of secrecy. 
But for some of these categories, the public’s interest is given very little 
weight, while the government’s interest in nondisclosure is given inordinate 
weight. Federal regulations require agencies to consider declassifying 
documents when “the need to protect properly classified information ‘may 
be outweighed by the public interest in disclosure of the information,’”11 
although, notably, the judicial branch is not authorized to review or apply 
this standard. Judicial review of FOIA claims seeking disclosure of 
information that the government claims is exempt under exemption one for 
national security or foreign defense information12 is typically deferential to 
the agency.13 Furthermore, in determining whether exemption one applies, 
courts are permitted to consider only whether information is properly 
classified.14 
 
 10. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (2006). 
 11. 32 C.F.R. § 1902.13 (2011).  
 12. Exemption states that the government may withhold information that is “(A) 
specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the 
interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) [is] in fact properly classified pursuant to 
such Executive order.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). 
 13. See Steven Aftergood, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works, 27 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 399, 407 (2009) (noting that federal courts are very deferential to the executive 
branch and “almost never overturn agency classification decisions”); Mary-Rose Papandrea, 
Under Attack: The Public’s Right To Know and the War on Terror, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 35, 52 
(2005) (noting that the “efforts to force disclosure of information pertaining to the 
government’s counterterrorism efforts through the . . . FOIA have been largely unsuccessful”); 
Patricia M. Wald, Two Unsolved Constitutional Problems, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 753, 760 (1988) 
(noting that judicial review of classified information under the FOIA “often seems to be done in 
a perfunctory way”). 
 14. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), (b). 
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Information is properly classified when its disclosure would risk some 
harm to national security, regardless of the public interest in that 
information. The level of classification also depends entirely on the level of 
possible damage to national security. For example, “Confidential” 
information is reasonably expected “to cause damage to the national 
security”; “Secret” information is reasonably expected “to cause serious 
damage to the national security”; and “Top Secret” information is reasonably 
expected “to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security.”15 
The classification regulations that prohibit the classification of information 
designed to “conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error,” 
or to “prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency,”16 might 
be seen as an effort to balance national security risk against the public 
interest, but only in a very narrow and limited way. Some presidents, 
including President Obama, have told agencies to apply a presumption of 
disclosure whenever there is significant doubt of the need to classify,17 but 
again this does not require a consideration of the public interest in 
disclosure but rather simply the disclosure’s risk of harming national 
security. 
Professor Fenster rightly praises the success of the Interagency Security 
Classification Appeals Panel (“ISCAP”). Steven Aftergood has proclaimed 
that the ISCAP “is among the most successful classification reform initiatives 
of the last half century.”18 The ISCAP’s record is impressive; it “has 
overturned more executive branch classification decisions than any court or 
legislative action.”19 According to the most recent government report, the 
panel has declassified information in sixty-five percent of its decisions since 
1996.20 In 2010, thirty-six percent of documents reviewed were declassified 
in their entirety, thirty-two percent were declassified in part, and thirty-two 
percent remained classified.21 The ISCAP arguably provides a more effective 
means of obtaining national security information from the government than 
the FOIA because FOIA court appeals are time-consuming, expensive, and 
usually unsuccessful given the court’s deference to the government on 
national security matters.22 Aftergood has suggested that the success of the 
 
 15. Exec. Order No. 13,526 § 1.2(a)(1)–(3), 75 Fed. Reg. 707–08 (Jan. 5, 2010). 
 16. Id. § 1.7(a). 
 17. Id. § 1.1(b). 
 18. Steven Aftergood, Roslyn Mazer To Be ODNI Inspector General, SECRECY NEWS (Apr. 6, 
2009), http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2009/04/mazer_odni_ig.html. 
 19. Steven Aftergood, National Security Secrecy: How the Limits Change, 77 SOC. RES. 839, 848 
(2010). 
 20. INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2010 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 26 
(2011), available at http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2010-annual-report.pdf. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Nate Jones, The CIA’s Covert Operation Against Declassification Review and Obama’s Open 
Government, UNREDACTED (Feb. 10, 2012), http://nsarchive.wordpress.com/2012/02/10/the-
cias-covert-operation-against-declassification-review-and-obamas-open-government/. 
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ISCAP is due to its ability to eliminate the bureaucratic and political uses of 
secrecy.23 The ISCAP’s success is not due, however, to its special ability to 
determine the public’s interest in information, or in balancing those 
interests against the harm of disclosure. Instead, the expertise of the 
members of the panel lies in assessing national security risk. 
Although the ISCAP has certainly declassified a significant amount of 
materials, the lack of a robust staff to deal with increasing amounts of 
appeals received, larger systemic issues of over-classification, and the 
possibility for agencies to appeal the panel’s decision over its head remain 
significant challenges.24 Furthermore, even if we magically could resolve this 
country’s massive overclassification problem, we would still have to 
determine when, if ever, the First Amendment protects the disclosure of 
classified information by government insiders or outsiders. 
B. GOVERNMENT INSIDERS 
The statutory provisions potentially applicable to government 
employees and independent contractors with access to confidential 
information (government insiders) do not require courts to undertake a 
balancing of competing interests. Furthermore, although the Supreme 
Court has never considered whether government insiders have any First 
Amendment right to engage in the unauthorized disclosure of national 
security information to the public, the Court’s primary decision in this 
area—Snepp v. United States25—strongly indicates that they do not, regardless 
of the balance of interests in any given case. 
At the outset, it is worth noting that Congress has not been able to pass 
the equivalent of an official-secrets act that would authorize the punishment 
of government insiders for the mere revelation of classification information, 
regardless of its content, the harm it might have on national security, or the 
intent of the leaker.26 In vetoing one attempt to pass such legislation, 
President Clinton noted that the law failed to strike the appropriate balance 
between the need to protect national security secrets and the need for the 
free flow of information in a democracy.27 
The Espionage Act and related statutes potentially applicable to 
government insiders who leak national security information do not require 
any sort of balancing test but instead appear to attempt to balance the 
competing interests at a higher, categorical level. Section 793(d) of the 
Espionage Act, which applies to those with authorized possession of national 
 
 23. Aftergood, supra note 13, at 407–09. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam). See infra text accompanying 
notes 37–42. 
 26. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press and National Security 
Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 262–63 (2008). 
 27. H.R. Doc. No. 106-309, at 1–2 (2000). 
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security information, prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of national 
security information which “the possessor has reason to believe could be 
used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign 
nation.”28 The Act does not require that the disclosure harm our nation; it 
can be sufficient if the disclosure advantages a foreign nation, friend or foe, 
and the leaker’s intent to contribute to the public debate is also irrelevant.29 
Furthermore, the harm that the government must show is minimal; courts 
have held that the prosecution must simply show the disclosure is 
“potentially damaging to the United States.”30 
Other provisions applicable to government insiders do not require even 
this minimal proof of harm. Section 798 bans the dissemination of 
“classified information . . . concerning the communication intelligence 
activities of the United States.”31 This statute does not require any showing 
of harm or “intent or reason to believe” any such harm or benefit to a 
foreign power would result. The Atomic Energy Act permits government 
insiders to be prosecuted for communicating “Restricted Data” to anyone 
not authorized to receive it, as long as they did so “knowing or having reason 
to believe” that the information was Restricted Data.32 Leakers have also 
been charged under 18 U.S.C. § 641, which imposes criminal penalties for 
the theft of government property; this provision also does not require any 
showing of harm to the United States or any consideration of the public 
interest.33 
In drafting the various provisions that criminalize the dissemination of 
national security information, Congress attempted to balance the need to 
protect national security interests with the value to public debate. In some 
cases, Congress concluded the harm of disclosure for certain types of 
information—such as information relating to communications intelligence 
or atomic energy—always outweighed any contribution the information 
might make to the public debate. In other provisions, Congress imposed 
additional requirements for prosecution with the intent of striking a more 
careful balance between national security and informed public debate. The 
best example of this is the Intelligence Identities Protection Act, which 
 
 28. 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) (2006). 
 29. See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1071–74 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 30. See, e.g., Morison, 844 F.2d at 1071; see also id. at 1086 (Phillips, J., concurring) (“One 
may wonder whether any information shown to be related somehow to national defense could 
fail to have at least some such ‘potential.’”); United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 621 
(E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d, 557 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 31. 18 U.S.C. § 798(a). 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 2277 (2006). “Restricted Data” is statutorily defined as “all data 
concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of 
special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy.” 
Id. § 2014(y). 
 33. 18 U.S.C. § 641; see also Morison, 844 F.2d at 1076–77 (affirming conviction of military 
intelligence employee who leaked information to a periodical publisher). 
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prohibits the identification of covert agents, but only if the identification was 
part of “a pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents 
and with reason to believe that such activities would impair or impede the 
foreign intelligence activities of the United States.”34 The pattern and intent 
requirements were specifically included to protect legitimate news reporting 
regarding government misconduct.35 The legislative history of the statute 
indicates that prosecutors would have to present some evidence that the 
disclosure was likely to cause harm and permit a defendant to present to the 
jury evidence of an intent to contribute to the public debate.36 Because 
Congress drafted the statute in a way that reflects its judgment regarding the 
proper balance between national security and informed public debate, the 
courts do not have to undertake this balance themselves. 
It is not clear whether the First Amendment places any limits on the 
statutory framework outlined above. The Supreme Court has never explicitly 
addressed whether government insiders have a First Amendment right to 
disclose national security information without authorization, but in the 
decision most closely related to this issue, the Court suggested that they do 
not. 
In Snepp, the Supreme Court held that current and former public 
employees and contractors (government insiders) who have signed 
nondisclosure agreements must submit to prepublication clearance before 
disclosing any information relating to their dealings with the government, or 
else risk the imposition of a constructive trust on any profits they might 
make from their work.37 In that case, a former CIA employee published a 
book without first submitting it for clearance, as required by the 
nondisclosure agreements that he had signed.38 One of the author’s primary 
defenses was that he did not actually publish any classified information, so 
there was no need for the prepublication review.39 In addition, the 
government conceded that it had not suffered any harm as a result of his 
failure to submit to that review process.40 The Court held that it was 
irrelevant that the author did not reveal any classified information because 
the CIA had an interest in protecting the appearance of secrecy.41 The Court 
did not address the value of the information to the public or conduct any 
 
 34. 50 U.S.C. § 421(c) (2006). 
 35. See Papandrea, supra note 26, at 276. 
 36. See id. 
 37. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam); see also 28 C.F.R. § 17.18 
(2011) (requiring all government employees with access to sensitive information to sign a 
nondisclosure agreement, thereby agreeing to submit to prepublication review). 
 38. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507–08. 
 39. See id. at 509–10. 
 40. See id. at 511–12 (noting that in that stage of the litigation the government was not 
contending that Snepp’s book contained confidential information). 
 41. Id. at 515–16. 
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meaningful inquiry into the national security harm the publication of the 
book may have caused.42 
In Snepp the Court inexplicably failed to address the applicability of 
Pickering v. Board of Education, in which the Court adopted a balancing test to 
evaluate the First Amendment claims of public employees.43 In Pickering, the 
Court recognized “that the State has interests as an employer in regulating 
the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in 
connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.”44 At 
the same time, the Court noted, “free and open debate is vital to informed 
decision-making by the electorate,” and government employees often are 
the ones “most likely to have informed and definite opinions” about matters 
of public concern relating to their employment.45 To reconcile these 
competing interests, the Court set up a balancing test for determining 
whether the employee’s constitutional rights had been violated. This test 
requires “a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as 
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees.”46 In the decades following the Pickering decision, the 
Court has incrementally scaled back on the First Amendment rights of 
public employees—most notably requiring that the speech involve a matter 
of public concern in order to trigger the balancing test—but the balancing 
test remains very much at the heart of any public employee’s free-speech 
claim. Although Pickering itself contained caveats upon which the Snepp 
Court could have relied to distinguish national security employees,47 the 
Court did not even attempt to justify its rejection of a balancing approach. 
The Supreme Court has never considered whether the First 
Amendment provides any measure of protection to a government insider 
who leaks national security information to the press or public without 
 
 42. Indeed, the CIA recently announced it is conducting an internal investigation to 
determine whether the publication review board’s decisions have been influenced by political 
considerations that are less favorable to those who are critical of the agency. See Greg Miller & 
Julie Tate, CIA Probes Publication Review Board over Allegations of Selective Censorship, WASH. POST 
(May 31, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-probes-publication-
review-board-over-allegations-of-selective-censorship/2012/05/31/gJQAhfPT5U_story.html. 
 43. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568–70 (1968). The Court subsequently 
applied the Pickering test to independent government contractors. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. 
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996). 
 44. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 45. Id. at 571–72.  
 46. Id. at 568. 
 47. See id. at 570 n.3 (noting the possibility of a different result in cases where “the need 
for confidentiality is so great that even completely correct public statements might furnish a 
permissible ground for dismissal,” or where the employer and supervisor have “such a personal 
and intimate” working relationship such that any criticism would undermine the effectiveness 
of that relationship); id. at 572 (noting the possibility of a different result in a case where the 
employee has greater access to the real facts than the general public).  
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authorization. Snepp certainly indicates that any argument for constitutional 
protection would face an uphill battle. Indeed, the lower courts disagree 
whether the unauthorized dissemination of national security information by 
government insiders is even speech within the scope of the First 
Amendment.48 In addition, the Court recently held that government 
employees have no First Amendment rights when they engage in expressive 
activities “pursuant to the employee’s official duties.”49 At least one 
commentator has interpreted Garcetti broadly to strip public employees of 
First Amendment protection whenever they disclose national security 
information they accessed through their government employment.50 
Regardless of whether this interpretation of Garcetti is correct, the decision 
does indicate the Court’s inclination to force leakers to rely on statutory 
rather than constitutional protections even when they engage in 
whistleblowing. Currently national security whistleblowers are entitled to 
very minimal statutory protection that covers only those who follow the 
proscribed reporting hierarchy to report flagrantly unlawful activity.51 The 
current statutory regime reflects an extremely lopsided balance of the 
public’s interest against potential national security harm. 
Most scholars and commentators have been willing to give the 
government broad authority to punish leakers,52 although some, including 
 
 48. Compare United States v. Kim, No. 10-225 (CKK), 2011 WL 838160, at *30 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 2, 2011) (“To the extent that the defendant’s conduct constitutes speech, that speech is 
wholly unprotected by the First Amendment.”), with United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 
602, 630 (E.D. Va. 2006) (rejecting government’s categorical argument that the espionage 
statutes do not implicate the First Amendment), aff’d, 557 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2009). In United 
States v. Morison, the panel opinion stated that “we do not perceive any First Amendment rights 
to be implicated here.” United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1068 (4th Cir. 1988). 
However, two of the three judges indicated in their concurring opinions that they simply 
believed that the conviction in that particular case did not offend the First Amendment. See id. 
at 1081 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (“I do not think the First Amendment interests here are 
insignificant.”); id. at 1085 (Phillips, J., concurring) (“I agree with Judge Wilkinson’s differing 
view that the [F]irst [A]mendment issues raised by Morison are real and substantial . . . .”). 
 49. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 413 (2006). 
 50. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Espionage Act and National Security Whistleblowing After Garcetti, 
57 AM. U. L. REV. 1531, 1534–35, 1540–41 (2008). Others have similarly suggested, without 
explicitly relying on Garcetti, that public employees have no First Amendment right to share 
information they learned only as a result of their employment. See Geoffrey R. Stone, WikiLeaks, 
the Proposed SHIELD Act, and the First Amendment, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 105, 111–12 
(2011). 
 51. See Papandrea, supra note 26, at 246–48. Efforts to reform whistleblower protections 
failed when Bradley Manning’s alleged disclosures came to light, even though he would have 
received no protection under revised provisions. Miranda Leitsinger, As Manning Heads to Trial 
over WikiLeaks, New Push for Whistleblower Protections, NBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2011, 6:54 AM), 
http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2011/12/16/9483316-as-manning-heads-to-trial-over-
wikileaks-new-push-for-whistleblower-protections.  
 52. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 79–82 (1975) (arguing for 
robust government authority to punish leakers but expansive authority for the press to publish 
the leaks). 
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myself, have begun to question the wisdom of this approach. Professor 
Geoffrey Stone is among those who have reconsidered this binary approach 
and has suggested that a more appropriate approach would be to balance 
the potential harm to national security against the value to public 
discourse,53 the kind of balancing test Professor Fenster criticizes in his 
article. This is not, however, the test that any court to date has embraced. 
C. GOVERNMENT OUTSIDERS 
The statutes potentially applicable to government outsiders do not 
require balancing. Many of them do not even require any showing of harm 
to national security or the intent to harm national security. It is also very 
unclear whether the First Amendment requires courts to conduct a 
balancing test. 
Many of the statutory provisions identified in the prior subsection 
relating to government insiders are potentially applicable to government 
outsiders as well. For example, section 798’s prohibition on the disclosure of 
communications intelligence, the Atomic Energy Act’s ban on the 
communication of Restricted Data, and the Intelligence Identities 
Protection Act are all equally applicable to government outsiders and do not 
require courts to balance disclosure’s potential harm against its value to the 
public debate. Section 793(e) criminalizes not only the willful 
communication of any document or information relating to the national 
defense but also the willful failure to return such documents to an 
appropriate United States official.54 If a defendant is charged with 
communicating information relating to the national defense, the statute 
requires a showing that the defendant did so with “reason to believe [it] 
could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any 
foreign nation.”55 Some courts have interpreted this as requiring a showing 
that the defendant had a “bad faith purpose to either harm the United 
States or to aid a foreign government.”56 Although this requirement might 
offer protection to well-meaning defendants who believed the disclosed 
information was important for the public to know, it does not require a 
court to balance the harm of disclosure against its benefits. It is also possible 
that government outsiders could be prosecuted for aiding and abetting and 
conspiracy charges whenever they obtain information from a source who 
 
 53. Geoffrey R. Stone, Free Speech and National Security, 84 IND. L.J. 939, 961 (2009). 
 54. 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2006). 
 55. Id. 
 56. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 626 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d, 557 F.3d 192 
(4th Cir. 2009). 
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violates federal law through the disclosure. Moreover these statutes do not 
require the government to satisfy any sort of balancing test.57 
Because the relevant statutes do not require any sort of balancing 
inquiry, the question is then whether the First Amendment requires such a 
balance. The Supreme Court has explicitly considered the First Amendment 
rights of government outsiders to disseminate national security information 
in only one case, New York Times Co. v. United States, the “Pentagon Papers” 
case.58 The Court issued a per curiam opinion stating only that the 
government had failed to bear its heavy burden to justify a prior restraint 
preventing newspapers from publishing the contents of a top-secret study of 
the Vietnam War.59 Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, stated that he 
would permit a prior restraint only based on proof that publication would 
“inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event 
kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea.”60 Justice 
Stewart similarly stated that a prior restraint is unconstitutional unless the 
government can demonstrate “direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to 
our Nation or its people.”61 None of the Justices argued that the Court 
should balance the potential for harm against the value to public debate to 
determine whether the newspapers could publish the Pentagon Papers.62 
The upshot of the Pentagon Papers decision is that when the government 
is seeking a prior restraint, the focus is solely on whether the government 
has demonstrated a sufficient risk of harm; any potential benefits that 
disclosure would have for the public discourse is simply not relevant. To be 
sure, it is unclear how the Court would have resolved the more difficult 
situation where the threatened disclosure both posed a high risk of harm 
and offered an important contribution to the public debate, but there is 
nothing in the Court’s opinion to suggest that balancing would be the 
appropriate approach even in that set of circumstances. 
The government has sought to enjoin publication only one other time, 
in United States v. Progressive, Inc.63 Relying on the Atomic Energy Act,64 the 
 
 57. See Papandrea, supra note 26, at 277; Steven I. Vladeck, Inchoate Liability and the 
Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 219 
(2007). 
 58. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (Pentagon Papers), 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam). 
 59. Id. at 714. 
 60. Id. at. 726–27 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
 61. Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 62. As Patricia Bellia has recently noted, the Court appeared to trust the newspapers to 
consider the competing interests at stake when making their publication decisions. Patricia L. 
Bellia, WikiLeaks and the Institutional Framework for National Security Disclosures, 121 YALE L.J. 1448, 
1505 (2012) (“The Pentagon Papers case assured that, once information of high public value was 
in the hands of the press, the press’s assessment would prevail over the government’s . . . .”). 
 63. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). The government 
has not sought a prior restraint since then, no doubt due not only to the high burden of proof 
the government must satisfy, but also its demonstrated ineffectiveness. Technological advances 
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government sought a temporary restraining order prohibiting the 
publication of an article entitled “The H-Bomb Secret: How We Got It, Why 
We’re Telling It.”65 The district court did superficially conduct the sort of 
balancing test Professor Fenster criticizes in his article,66 but the court was 
plainly overwhelmed by the perceived risk of national security harm to give 
the information’s potential contribution to the public debate full 
consideration. In other words, although the court said it was balancing, its 
decision rested almost completely on its conclusion that the government 
had met the high burden the Court set for prior restraints in the Pentagon 
Papers case. Furthermore, the court cites no authority for its balancing 
approach. The case was mooted on appeal after the information at issue 
became widely available.67 
It is entirely unclear whether a majority of the Court would apply the 
same stringent burden of proof of direct and immediate harm to national 
security in a criminal prosecution based on the unauthorized disclosure of 
national security information. Prior restraints are historically disfavored, and 
a careful reading of the various opinions in the Pentagon Papers case indicate 
that a majority of Justices might have ruled in the government’s favor had it 
not sought a prior restraint but rather prosecuted the newspapers after 
publication.68 
It is therefore certainly possible that a court confronted with a criminal 
prosecution against a government outsider based on the unauthorized 
dissemination of national security information would decide that balancing 
the harm to national security against the value to the public debate is an 
appropriate method of resolving the First Amendment concerns at stake. 
Indeed, in United States v. Rosen, the only district court to rule on a 
prosecution against a government outsider gave lip service to a balancing 
inquiry.69 In that case, the government prosecuted two lobbyists for violating 
the Espionage Act.70 In evaluating the defendants’ First Amendment 
defense, the court said that it had to determine whether Congress had 
struck a “constitutionally permissible” balance between the competing 
interests of national security and informed public debate.71 To do this, the 
 
permitting the easy transmission and distribution of information on the internet make it 
exceedingly unlikely that the government ever will. 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 2280 (2006). 
 65. Progressive, 467 F. Supp. at 991. 
 66. See id. at 996 (balancing the risk to national security against the defendants’ interest in 
promoting public knowledge). 
 67. See Papandrea, supra note 26, at 273 (“The government ultimately abandoned its case 
against The Progressive because other publications revealed the same information . . . .”). 
 68. See id. at 279–80. 
 69. United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 645–46 (E.D. Va. 2006), aff’d, 557 F.3d 
192 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 70. Id. at 607–11. 
 71. Id. at 629. 
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court stated, it “must begin with an assessment of the competing societal 
interests at stake and proceed to the delicate and difficult task of weighing 
those interests to determine whether the resulting restriction on freedom 
[of speech] can be tolerated.”72 
Despite all its talk about balancing, however, the court in Rosen did not 
engage in a straightforward balancing of competing interests, at least not in 
the context-specific way that courts typically conduct balancing tests. Instead, 
the court recognized the dangers of permitting the government to restrict 
the dissemination and discussion of any information—even national security 
information—and determined that the First Amendment would therefore 
tolerate such restrictions only when the government can demonstrate that 
the disclosure involved closely held information regarding “the nation’s 
military activities, intelligence gathering, or foreign policy” that was 
potentially harmful to national security and that the defendant knew of this 
potential harm.73 Indeed, the court concluded its opinion by noting that its 
conclusion that the relevant statutes are constitutional “does not reflect a 
judgment about whether Congress could strike a more appropriate balance 
between these competing interests, or whether a more carefully drawn 
statute could better serve both the national security and the value of public 
debate.”74 The district court plainly did not conduct its own context-specific 
balancing inquiry; instead, it considered the weight of the competing 
interests at a high level of generality. Furthermore, the harm standard the 
court adopted—a “potentially damaging” standard75—is not a difficult 
standard for the government to meet, or for a court to apply. 
Despite their discussion of balancing, then, the underlying assumption 
of both The Progressive and Rosen is that information that poses a grave (or, as 
in Rosen, a potential) risk of harm to national security does not meaningfully 
contribute to the public debate. It remains unclear how the courts would 
deal with a case where both the potential harm to national security and the 
value of the information to the public dialogue are high. Some scholars have 
argued that even in cases where the government has made a showing that 
disclosure threatens grave harm to national security, courts should go on to 
consider whether the disclosure would “meaningfully contribute to public 
 
 72. Id. at 633 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 73. Id. at 643. The court also held that the government must demonstrate that a valid 
government regulation or order restricted the dissemination of information to a restricted set 
of individuals, that the person who received the information was outside of this set, and the 
defendant delivered the information to the unauthorized person despite knowing that the 
information was restricted and the recipient was outside of the group authorized to receive it 
and that therefore the communication was illegal. Id. In addition, the court held that in cases 
involving the disclosure of intangible information, the government must demonstrate “that the 
defendant had a reason to believe that the disclosure of the information could harm the United 
States or aid a foreign nation.” Id. 
 74. Id. at 646. 
 75. Id. at 621. 
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debate.”76 Importantly, however, this approach does not require courts to 
balance the harms and benefits of disclosure; even if the information does 
pose a grave harm to national security, the defendant will prevail as long as 
the disclosure is valuable to the public. 
If the Court applies the same standard for both prior restraints and 
criminal prosecutions,77 without requiring an additional, explicit balancing 
inquiry, it will not be necessary for courts to balance incommensurate 
interests. The government will not be able to satisfy a direct, immediate, and 
unavoidable harm requirement in most cases. In addition, judges will have 
the benefit of hindsight to evaluate the government’s claims that the 
disclosure caused direct and immediate harm. Judges would not have to 
engage in the sort of “predictive calculations” that concern Professor Fenster 
to determine whether to credit the government’s arguments.78 If the 
government is unable or unwilling to demonstrate the resulting harm, the 
government will lose. 
Putting to one side the Pentagon Papers case—which does not indicate 
that any balancing is required—it is somewhat unclear from the Court’s 
other First Amendment cases whether courts evaluating the First 
Amendment claims of government outsiders should balance the competing 
interests at stake. Balancing is certainly present in other areas of the First 
Amendment.79 Furthermore, the Court’s decision in Dennis v. United States, 
which balanced competing interests in the context of incitement, has never 
been overruled.80 Perhaps most significantly, the Court suggested the 
possibility of a balancing approach in its prior decisions involving the 
dissemination of lawfully obtained information. In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the 
Court held that the First Amendment prohibited the prosecution under 
state and federal wiretap laws of individuals who lawfully obtained an 
illegally intercepted copy of a private phone call conversation about ongoing 
union negotiations.81 The majority held that the privacy interests at stake 
“give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public 
importance.”82 In an important concurring opinion, Justice Breyer argued 
 
 76. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 185, 204 (2007).  
 77. I have argued elsewhere that the Court should apply the same standard in criminal 
prosecutions. Papandrea, supra note 26, at 280–81; see also Stone, supra note 53, at 958 (the 
government should be required to demonstrate “grave and imminent harm”). 
 78. See, e.g., Fenster, supra note 1, at 791 (noting that the WikiLeaks disclosures would 
require “the courts to explicitly perform some predictive calculation” to determine the threat of 
harm); id. at 806–07 (“Courts can continue to rely upon the idea that they are ‘balancing’ 
various ‘interests,’ but all they do in such instances is make intuitive guesses as to what might 
happen in the wake of disclosure or its absence.”).  
 79. See supra text accompanying notes 5–7. 
 80. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
 81. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
 82. Id. at 534. 
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that the plaintiffs “had little or no legitimate interest in maintaining the 
privacy of the particular conversation,” while the public had a particularly 
high level of interest in the conversation because it concerned a threat of 
violence.83 
Nevertheless, one reason why balancing may not play an important role 
in a prosecution of Julian Assange is that the government is likely to allege 
that he was somehow complicit in the leaks themselves. Under this 
approach, the government would rely on Bartnicki not so much because the 
government believes the balance of interests tips in its favor but rather 
because that decision undermines any First Amendment claim Assange 
might make.84 Bartnicki suggests that the First Amendment does not offer 
any protection to a defendant who obtains the national security information 
at issue unlawfully. Bartnicki itself does not draw a clear line between what 
constitutes lawful and unlawful acquisition of information, but under 
current law, government outsiders could be prosecuted for aiding and 
abetting a government insider’s disclosure.85 If a source simply drops 
classified documents in someone’s mailbox, as happened in Bartnicki, 
solicitation has not occurred, but any conduct beyond that might be 
sufficient. Taking a source out to dinner or a ballgame might be enough; 
even simply providing a fax machine—or electronic drop box—to make 
disclosures easier might be sufficient.86 The government may have even 
unearthed some evidence that Assange was involved in a conspiracy to reveal 
U.S. government secrets; if that is the case, he will have a particularly 
difficult time mounting a successful First Amendment defense. 
II. WIKILEAKS: NOT THE MOST DIFFICULT CASE 
It is not usually the courts that weigh the harm to national security 
against the public interest in the information; instead, it is the New York 
Times and other journalists and media outlets who conduct this balancing 
test when they decide what information to disseminate. Frequently 
journalists meet with government officials to help them determine the harm 
to national security, but then the journalists and publications make their 
own editorial decisions about what information to publish and what 
 
 83. Id. at 539 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 84. See Peter Grier, WikiLeaks Chief Julian Assange: “Terrorist” or Journalist?, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/1220/WikiLeaks-chief-Julian-
Assange-Terrorist-or-journalist; Vladeck, supra note 57, at 232–36 (discussing the implications 
of Bartnicki for defendants charged with inchoate crimes). 
 85. Furthermore, as Justice Breyer suggested in his concurrence, Congress could pass a 
law criminalizing the knowing receipt of illegally acquired information. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 
538 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 86. See United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 607–11, 644 (E.D. Va. 2006) 
(addressing a government outsider charged with aiding and abetting the illegal disclosure of 
national security information by providing a fax machine on which to receive information), 
aff’d, 557 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2009). 
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information to redact. At times editors even heed officials’ requests to delay 
or even forego publication.87 Prior to entities like WikiLeaks, those who 
wanted to leak sensitive national security information generally had to go 
through an intermediary if they wanted anyone in the world to pay attention 
to it. For the most part, that is still true, but WikiLeaks and everything it 
represents—easy technology, disclosure outside of U.S. borders—raise the 
specter that these gate-keeping intermediaries making generally responsible 
publication decisions are no longer necessary. 
Thus, as Professor Fenster himself notes, WikiLeaks is primarily 
notable—and a cause for concern in the United States—not because of what 
it disseminated but the quantity of what it disseminated.88 WikiLeaks is 
notable not because the disclosures were all that harmful, but because 
government officials fear they are losing the ability to control classified 
information and that the generally responsible mainstream media will not 
always stand in between a leaker and the American public (or the world).89 
This is not to discount Professor Fenster’s important work suggesting 
that we need to think very carefully about what it means for transparency to 
serve the public interest. It just means that a close examination of WikiLeaks 
is not necessarily the best vehicle for doing so. There have been other leaks 
that have presented the concerns Professor Fenster raises in a much more 
profound manner. For example, the recent leaks about U.S. policy 
regarding drone attacks and cyberattacks are examples of leaks that are both 
arguably harmful to national security but also contribute immensely to the 
public debate on whether and how we are going to use these relatively new 
tools to fight terrorism.90 
It is easiest to identify harms when a disclosure undermines the nation’s 
ability to preserve its physical safety or the safety of its personnel and 
facilities. Most people agree that disclosures revealing the movements of 
troops or ships or uncovering the identity of intelligence operatives, sources, 
and methods undermine their effectiveness. In those situations, secrecy is 
essential, and the harm that results from exposure will be imminent. Other 
 
 87. Congress Eyes Crackdown over Leaks About Secret Programs (PBS television broadcast June 7, 
2012), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/jan-june12/leaks_06-07.html (David Sanger 
states that he withheld technical details about Obama’s national security policies in new book 
after talking to government officials). 
 88. Fenster, supra note 1, at 776–77. 
 89. Relatedly, WikiLeaks also raises interesting questions regarding the extraterritorial 
application of the Espionage Act and related statutes, whether extradition law and treaties 
would permit noncitizens to be extradited to the United States for prosecution, and whether 
the First Amendment offers any protection to noncitizens prosecuted for conduct abroad. 
 90. See Scott Shane, U.S. Attacks, Online and from the Air, Fuel Secrecy Debate, N.Y. TIMES (June 
6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/07/world/americas/drones-and-cyberattacks-renew-
debate-over-security.html. I recognize that these leaks occurred after Professor Fenster 
completed his article; I simply offer them as examples of leaks for which a balancing of interests 
would be particularly difficult.  
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kinds of harm are much less tangible. Secrecy may encourage foreign 
nations to be more forthcoming and cooperative with the U.S. Discussions 
among government officials may not be as robust and honest if participants 
cannot depend upon secrecy. Officials from foreign nations may not be as 
willing to have open and frank communications with their U.S. counterparts 
if they cannot trust that the dialogue will remain confidential. 
Striking the appropriate balance is extremely difficult. In some 
instances, the harm is significant and the public benefit likely small—like 
revealing the identities of confidential intelligence sources. In other cases, 
the risk is small but the public interest great. The hard cases, however, are 
those where both the harm to national security interests and the public 
interest in disclosure are great. Harm can range from tangible to intangible, 
from imminent to long-term, from minor to severe. In other instances, leaks 
may hurt national security in the short run but serve to strengthen it in the 
long run. Robert Gates has said that he frequently heard about problems he 
needed to correct only through the media, and not from the affected 
agencies themselves. For example, he said that he learned about the lack of 
armored vehicles in Iraq from a story in USA Today.91 
Fenster also suggests that the WikiLeaks disclosures do not serve the 
public interest because no one seems to care. He notes that no political 
movements have resulted from these disclosures, and public opinion is not 
strongly supportive of WikiLeaks’s mission. Taking the last point first, it is 
hardly surprising that the public does not support WikiLeaks, because the 
mainstream media has done a fabulous job of portraying Julian Assange as a 
social misfit.92 The lack of political movements is not irrelevant, but if the 
need for government accountability is measured solely by whether a political 
movement has resulted, most government operations will be cloaked in 
secrecy. 
III. GOING FORWARD 
The WikiLeaks saga initially led many, including myself, to suggest that 
courts were finally going to end the “benign indeterminancy” surrounding 
the First Amendment rights of government outsiders who disseminate 
national security information.93 But the reaction to the recent series of leaks 
 
 91. Al Kamen, Robert Gates on Obama, Leaks and More, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/in-the-loop/post/robert-gates-on-obama-leaks-and-
more/2012/03/20/gIQAExr3PS_blog.html. 
 92. See Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: WikiLeaks and the Battle over the Soul of the 
Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.- C.L. L. REV. 311 (2011). 
 93. Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense 
Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 936 (1973); see also William H. Freivogel, Publishing 
National Security Secrets: The Case for “Benign Indeterminacy,” 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 95 
(2009) (arguing against a bright-line rule for journalists that may be in violation of the 
Espionage Act). 
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about President Obama’s national security policies with respect to drone 
attacks and cyber-warfare indicates that the focus will be not on the rights of 
government outsiders to disseminate information they receive from leakers, 
but on the rights of leakers who share that information in the first place. 
Congress and the courts have great work to do in this area if they intend to 
even attempt to balance national security and the free flow of information. 
As Professor Fenster has noted in his prior work, government entities 
are skilled at avoiding disclosure requirements under the FOIA, open 
meeting laws, and related statutes.94 For better or for worse, leaks help fill 
the gaps of our statutory system and play an essential role in checking 
government abuse.95 Although leaks play this important role, prevailing 
wisdom has been that government insiders have been granted little 
protection, while government outsiders have functioned with virtual carte 
blanche to publish or otherwise disseminate whatever they could get their 
hands on. The reasons why this approach worked relatively well was that the 
government had a very difficult time figuring out who the leakers were, 
which meant that we did not have to worry very much about chilling 
legitimate leaks. Technological changes have made it much easier for the 
government to identify and prosecute leakers, and the government is taking 
full advantage of this opportunity to teach leakers a lesson. 
If the government intends to prosecute government insiders for leaking 
national security information and government outsiders for distributing it, 
these criminal statutes require significant revisions. For all of the reasons 
Professor Fenster gives in his article, Congress should be reluctant to 
embrace a standard that requires courts to weigh the costs and benefits of 
disclosure. Instead, Congress should give careful consideration to what 
categories of information are most important to keep secret. But Congress 
should not stop there. Fenster suggests that there is a category of cases in 
which no balancing is needed because the arguments against disclosure are 
so strong, such as cases involving “the disclosure of advanced military 
technologies, current troop movements and similar operative war plans, and 
the identities of intelligence sources.”96 The problem is that even with 
respect to these categories, there may be instances where disclosure truly 
serves the public interest. As a statutory matter, Congress should give serious 
consideration to providing greater protections for national intelligence 
whistleblowers who reveal government malfeasance of some kind, such as 
fraud, waste, or illegality. In addition, Congress should consider providing 
protection for government insiders who have a good-faith belief that the 
information they are disclosing reveals those things. With respect to 
 
 94. Fenster, supra note 3, at 933–34 (noting that government can change its practices to 
avoid disclosure laws and openness requirements). 
 95. See Papandrea, supra note 26, at 240–62 (outlining the history and important role of 
leaks). 
 96. Fenster, supra note 1, at 782. 
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government outsiders, Congress should recognize that the First Amendment 
protects their right to disseminate information they have lawfully acquired 
absent serious, imminent, and irreparable harm to national security. 
Given the increasing number of leak prosecutions, it is possible that one 
day the Supreme Court will have to consider whether government insiders 
have any First Amendment rights to engage in the unauthorized disclosure 
of national security information. As discussed above in Part I, the prevailing 
assumption that government insiders have no such rights is inconsistent with 
the Court’s jurisprudence regarding public employees generally. But if the 
Court embraces the Pickering balancing test for government employees who 
leak sensitive national security information, the concerns that Professor 
Fenster raises in his article will potentially come to a head. 
If the Court does decide to embrace a balancing test for public 
employees who disclose national security information without authorization, 
however, I am not as concerned as Professor Fenster is with the ability of 
courts to engage in that analysis. I recognize that the Court has frequently 
displayed deference to the political branches,97 and that courts deciding 
FOIA challenges have not always been willing to question the government’s 
assertions regarding the need for secrecy. But judges are not incapable of 
engaging in this analysis. Indeed, the judicial process can provide an 
important mechanism for making sure the government justifies the need for 
secrecy. In criminal prosecutions, the horse is out of the barn, and the 
ramifications of the disclosures are easier to see. If the government still 
cannot demonstrate any harm, there is no reason to accept their assertions 
that the harm will come. Judges are also in a good position to determine 
whether the disclosure of information serves the public interest. In 
defamation and privacy cases, as well as employment cases, courts frequently 
have to determine whether the disclosure of information is “newsworthy” or 
serves the public interest.98 This is not to suggest that the public-concern 
inquiry is easy or unproblematic. It is neither. But it is certainly the sort of 
inquiry with which courts are familiar. At the very least, one would hope that 
 
 97. See, e.g., Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988) (“[T]he protection of 
classified information must be committed to the broad discretion of the agency responsible, 
and this must include broad discretion to determine who may have access to it.”); CIA v. Sims, 
471 U.S. 159, 176 (1985) (“We seriously doubt whether a potential intelligence source will rest 
assured knowing that judges, who have little or no background in the delicate business of 
intelligence gathering, will order his identity revealed only after examining the facts of the case 
to determine whether the Agency actually needed to promise confidentiality in order to obtain 
the information.”); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 546 (1956) (stating in dicta that “there is a 
reasonable basis for the view that an agency head who must bear the responsibility for the 
protection of classified information committed to his custody should have the final say in 
deciding whether to repose his trust in an employee who has access to such information”). 
 98. Clay Calvert, Defining “Public Concern” After Snyder v. Phelps: A Pliable Standard Mingles 
with News Media Complicity, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 39, 39–46 (2012) (outlining the various 
areas of free-speech jurisprudence requiring courts to engage in a public-concern inquiry). 
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courts would conclude that any interest the government has in controlling 
the dissemination of national security information would give way in cases 
involving the disclosure of criminal wrongdoing, waste, or fraud. 
CONCLUSION 
An essential underlying assumption of Professor Fenster’s article is that 
a court evaluating the prosecution of a government outsider like Julian 
Assange must balance the competing societal interests at stake in each 
particular case. This Response has attempted to demonstrate that this 
assumption rests on a very weak foundation. When it comes to the disclosure 
of national security information—whether in the context of the 
government’s affirmative duty to disclose information or the law governing 
government insiders and outsiders who disclose national security 
information without authorization—the relevant statutory provisions do not 
require courts to conduct this balancing test. In addition, it is hardly obvious 
that the First Amendment requires such an inquiry. Nevertheless, because 
Professor Fenster is correct that striking the balance between the competing 
societal interests is difficult on a case-by-case basis, this Response urges 
Congress to reform the Espionage Act and related statutes to reflect a 
careful consideration of these interests with respect to disclosures by both 
government insiders and outsiders. 
 
